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SECURITIES LAW-THE STANDARD OF LIABILITY UNDER RULE 
10b-5 IN CASES OF NONDISCLOSURE-Chiarella v. United States, 
100 S. Ct. 1108 (1980). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Vincent Chiarella worked for more than twenty years! for 
Pandick Press, a specialized printing hous~ in Manhattan. 2 He rose 
from the positions of linotype operator and copy cutter to become 
a mark-up man earning over $22,000 per year. As a mark-up man, 
Chiarella was the first person in the composing room to receive 
confidential statements and fonus from customers in law firms, 
banking houses,4 and corporations. 5 In addition to preparing mun­
dane documents including annual reports and proxy statements, 
Chiarella also regularly received drafts of Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) fonus requiring public disclosure of tender of­
fers.6 
The premium offered by the tender offeror has the effect of 
raising the market price of the target company's stock once the ten­
der offer is announced because market traders will know that the 
value of the target company's assets and earning power have been 
markedly increased. 7 Therefore, to preserve confidentiality as long 
1. Brief for United States at 4, Chiarella v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1108 
(1980). 
2. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1363 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 100 S. 
Ct. 1108 (1980). 
3. Brief for United States at 4, Chiarella v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1108 
(1980). 
4. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1363 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 100 S. 
Ct. 1108 (1980). 
5. Brief for United States at 4, Chiarella v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1108 
(1980). 
6. A tender offer is a bid by an individual or group (the "tender offeror") to 
purchase shares of a corporation commonly at a "premium," a price above the cur­
rent market price. See D. VAGTS, BASIC CORPORATION LAW 641-52 (1979). The com­
pany whose shares are being acquired is called the "target" corporation. Under the 
Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(I) (1976), a tender offeror may acquire up to 5% of 
the target's shares before public disclosure is required. 
7. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1363 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 100 S. 
Ct. 1108 (1980). Both the district court and the court of appeals recognized that pre­
announcement secrecy is essential to the success of a tender offer or takeover. Sud­
den trading in the target company's stock might alert that corporation to the tender 
offeror's plans for acquisition. Also, if there is a premature announcement of a tender 
offer, trading will result in a premature price rise in the target company's stock to­
ward the expected premium: 
Thus the primary inducement to stockholders-an offer to purchase their 
99 
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as possible, and to prevent an anticipatory price rise in the target 
company's stock, vital informationS received by Chiarella concern­
ing the tender offers was left absent or in code until the night of 
the final printing. 9 Chiarella, however, in addition to his skills as a 
printer, was a knowledgeable stock trader who spoke with his bro­
ker up to fifteen times a daylO and often watched the ticker tape at 
his broker's office. 11 He deciphered the code or discerned the 
identity of the target companies on five occasions by comparing in­
formation in the draft prospectuses12 with information contained in 
stock guides obtained from his broker.13 Disregarding notices 
posted throughout the printing house which stated that use of cus­
tomers' confidential information for personal gain was illegal,14 
Chiarella invested in the target companies' stock for his own and 
for his father's accounts. Chiarella remained silent with respect to 
his trading activities. He did not disclose his investments to the 
target corporations or to the tender offerors from whom the infor­
mation was received. 15 Once the tender offers were made public 
by the corporations involved, investors bought shares of the target 
companies, and the price of Chiarella's stock increased. substan­
tially.16 He then quickly sold at a profit, netting more than $30,000 
shares at an attractive price above the market-is lost, and the offeror may 
be forced to abandon its plans or to raise the offer to a still higher price. The 
cost of an offer to purchase hundreds of thousands of shares might prove 
prohibitive if the price had to be increased only a few dollars per share. 
Brief for United States at 32, Chiarella v. United States, 100 S. Ct. H08 (1980) 
(quoting Proposed Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership and in Corporate 
Takeover Bids: Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate 
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1967) (statement of 
Donald Calvin, Vice President of the New York Stock Exchange)). 
8. The encoded or absent information included the names of the tender offerors 
and the prospective target companies. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 
1363 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 100 S. Ct. H08 (1980). 
9. Chiarella v. United States, 100 S. Ct. H08, 1112 (1980). 
10. United States v. Chiarella,588 F.2d 1358, 1363 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 100 S. 
Ct. 1108 (1980). 
11. Brief for United States at 6, Chiarella v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1108 
(1980). 
12. This information consisted of, for example, the market on which the stock 
was traded, the number of outstanding shares, the par values of the stock, and the 
high and low bids for the preceding year. Id. at 7. 
13. [d. 
14. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1369 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 100 S. 
Ct. 1108 (1980). 
15. [d. at 1363. 
16. See notes 6 & 7 supra and accompanying text. 
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for securities transactions involving five corporate takeover bids17 
over a period of fourteen months. 
Alerted by the New York Stock Exchange to the unusual trad­
ing,18 the SEC investigated Chiarella's activities. In a consent de­
cree in May of 1977, he agreed to forfeit his profits to those who 
had sold him the target stock. 19 On the same day, he was dis­
missed from his position at Pandick. On January 4, 1978, Chiarella 
was indicted on seventeen counts20 of wilful misuse of material21 
nonpublic information in connection with the purchase and sale of 
securities, in violation of the antifraud provisions of section lO(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act)22 and rule lOb-5 23 
17. Four of the transacuuns were tender offers and one was a merger. United 
States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1363 n.2 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 100 S. Ct. 1108 
(1980). 
18. Greenhouse, Supreme Court Rules for Printer, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1980, 
§ D, at 18, col. 1. 
19. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1364 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 100 S. 
Ct. 1108 (1980). Consent decrees had been obtained from four other printers be­
tween 1974 and 1978. See, e.g., SEC v. Sorg Printing Co., [1974-1975 Transfer 
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 94,767, at 95,567 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
20. The Securities Exchange Act of1934, § 32(a), 15 U .S.C. § 78ff(a) (1976) [herein­
after cited as the 1934 Act] sanctions criminal penalties against any person who wil­
fully violates the Act. Chiarella was charged with 17 counts because he had received 
17 letters confirming his purchases of shares. It is unlawful under rule IOb-5 to use 
the mails to effect the employment of manipulative and deceptive devices in the 
trading of securities. 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1979). See note 23 infra. 
21. The information concerning the impending tender offers was stipulated to 
be material. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1364 n.5 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 
100 S. Ct, 1108 (1980). 
22. Section lO(b) of the 1934 Act states: 

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any 

means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any fa­

cility of any national securities exchange ... (b) To use or employ, in con­

nection with the purchase or sale of any security not so registered, any ma­

nipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules 

and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropri­

ate in the public interest or for the protection of investors. 

Section lO(b) is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976). 
23. 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1979) provides: 

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any 

means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or the mails or of any facil­

ity of any national securities exchange, 

a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 

b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a ma­

terial fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 

circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or 

c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or 

would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person in connection with the 

purchase or sale of any security. 
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promulgated thereunder which prohibit the use of manipulative 
and deceptive devices in the trading of securities. In a motion to 
dismiss, Chiarella argued unsuccessfully that he was not subject to 
the traditional disclose-or-abstain-from-trading rule under rule 
lOb-5 and that consequently the indictment did not charge a 
crime. 24 In 1978, a jury convicted Chiarella on every count. 25 
In United States v. Chiarella,26 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit, in an opinion by Chief Judge 
Kaufman, affirmed Chiarella's conviction. The court delineated a 
broad new test for liability under rule lOb-5 to proscribe nondis­
closure in the purchase or sale of a security by subjecting "any­
one" with "regular access to market information" to a duty to 
disclose or abstain from trading. 27 Recently, however, a six-mem­
ber majority of the United States Supreme Court reversed the 
Second Circuit, stating that in nondisclosure cases, a duty to speak, 
which was absent in Chiarella's case, must be present to make si­
lence fraudulent under section 10(b). 
Chiarella v. United States28 is an opinion having a significant 
impact upon public investors, the SEC, and the market profession­
als29 who make up the securities industry. The Supreme Court's 
decision clarifies the standard of rule 10b-5 liability for violations 
involving the failure to disclose material nonpublic information. At 
the same time, Chiarella halts for the moment judicial expansion of 
rule 10b-5 by the lower courts. The majority opinion, written by 
Justice Powell and strongly criticized in two dissenting opinions, 30 
represents the continuation of a trend by the Court to restrict the 
reach of the antifraud sections of the securities laws. 31 On the 
24. United States v. Chiarella, 450 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 588 F.2d 1358 
(2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 100 S. Ct. 1108 (1980). 
25. ld. 
26. 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 100 S. Ct. n08 (1980). 
27. ld. at 1365. 
28. 100 S. Ct. ll08 (1980). 
29. Market professionals are securities dealers such as specialists, block 
positioners, floor traders and arbitrageurs. See Securities Indus. Assoc. memorandum 
amicus curiae at 12, Chiarella v. United States, 100 S. Ct. n08 (1980). 
30. Separate dissenting opinions were written by Chief Justice Burger and by 
Justice Blackmun, who was joined by Justice Marshall. See text accompanying notes 
103-113 infra. 
31. See, e.g., Aaron v. SEC, 100 S. Ct. 1945 (1980) (requiring proof of scienter 
in SEC actions to enjoin securities law violations under § 10(b), rule lOb-5 of the 1934 
Act and § 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 
U.S. 185 (1976) (requiring proof of scienter as a prerequisite in private actions for 
damages under rule 10b-5). See also International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Dan­
iel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979) (denying the applicability of the securities laws, including 
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other hand, the Court expressed an apparent willingness to con­
sider an alternative theory of rule lOb-5 liability posited by the 
government, namely that Chiarella violated his duty of silence to 
his employer and to the tender offerors. 32 The majority on the 
Court decided, however, that the government's theory had not 
properly been presented to the jury.33 Had the alternative theory 
properly been presented, Chiarella's conviction might have been 
upheld. The decision, therefore, leaves room for the possible ex­
pansion of rule 10b-5 at a later date. 
In order to fully comprehend the degree to which the Second 
Circuit expanded and the Supreme Court subsequently contracted 
the scope of the duty to disclose under rule lOb-5, the original 
purpose, language, and evolution of the rule is examined in section 
II. In section III, the test delineated by the Second Circuit and 
the attendant but unforeseen difficulties of that test are discussed. 
The fourth section describes the Supreme Court's response to the 
Second Circuit and is followed in section V by an exposition and 
discussion of the government's alternative theory of liability. In 
section VI, this note concludes with a proposal of a standard for 
nondisclosure violations of rule 10b-5 which aims at an interpreta­
tion of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws that is more 
flexible than the one stated by the Supreme Court, yet is not 
overly broad. 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF RULE lOb-5 
The purpose behind rule lOb-5, adopted almost a decade after 
the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act)34 and the 1934 Act,35 was to 
close a loophole in the otherwise comprehensive sections of the 
major securities laws. For the most part, sellers of a corporation's 
securities had been left unprotected from manipulative and decep­
tive practices on the part of those who bought their shares. 36 
§ lO(b) and rule lOb-5, to noncontributory compulsory pension plans); Santa Fe In­
dus. Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (holding that § 10(b) and rule lOb-5 will not 
reach mere breaches of fiduciary duty, absent some manipulation or deception); Blue 
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (limiting private actions for 
damages under rule lOb-5 to actual purchasers or sellers of a corporation's securi­
ties). 
32. See text accompanying notes 118-24 infra. 
33. See text accompanying notes 125-35 infra. 
34. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1976) [hereinafter cited as 
the 1933 Act]. 
35. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976). 
36. Comment, The Prospects for Rule X-lOb-5: An Emerging Remedy for De­
frauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1127 (1950). Only § 17(a) of the 1933 Act, out­
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The civil liability sections of the 1933 Act, which dealt primar­
ily with the issuance of new securities rather than with trading, of­
fered remedies only to defrauded buyers. The rules against fraud 
in the purchase of securities promulgated under the 1934 Act prior 
to rule lOb-5 applied only to misconduct by brokers and dealers. 37 
The addition of section 15(c)38 to the 1934 Act39 did grant the first 
major protection to victimized sellers of securities. 4o But section 
15(c), which prohibited fraud or misrepresentation in the purchase 
as well as in the sale of securities, applied only to brokers and 
dealers and to transactions which were not effected on a national 
exchange. 41 A considerable gap remained, as neither fraud in the 
purchase of securities on a national exchange nor fraud by persons 
other than broker-dealers was covered. 42 Traders who fell into the 
latter category were those in corporate office who purchased shares 
in the corporation while in possession of confidential information. 
As long as the profits resulting from an increase in the stock's mar­
ket price upon public disclosure43 were not realized within six 
months,44 members of this group were immune from liability. Rule 
lOb-5 was promulgated, therefore, in order to extend a remedy to 
aggrieved sellers of a corporation's securities against fraud perpe­
trated by buyers, whether individuals or companies, in securities 
lawing fraud "in the sale of" securities could have been interpreted to include fraud 
by buyers or sellers. It was not, however. Id. at 1127-28. 
37. SEC Exch. Act ReI. No. 34-3230 (May 21, 1942), reprinted in 4 A. BROM­
BERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD, App. B, at 295 
(1979). 
38. Section 15(c) of the 1934 Act states: 
(c) No broker or dealer shall make use of the mails or of any means or in­
strumentality of interstate commerce to effect any transaction in, or to in­
duce the purchase or sale of, any security ... otherwise than on a national 
securities exchange, by means of any manipulative, deceptive or other fraud­
ulent device or contrivance. The Commission shall, for purposes of this sub­
section, by rules and regulations define such devices or contrivances as are 
manipulative, deceptive, or otherwise fraudulent. 
15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(I) (1976) (originally enacted as Act of June 6, 1934, c. 404, § 15, 
48 Stat. 895). 
39. Buyers and sellers were granted specific remedies for designated types of 
unfair conduct under §§ 9(e), 16(b) and 18(a) of the 1934 Act, but these sections were 
too narrowly drawn to do sellers much benefit. For example, the profits recovered in 
an action by a security holder under § 16(b) were returned to the corporation, not to 
defrauded buyers or sellers. Comment, supra note 36, at 1128-29. 
40. Id. at 1129-30. 
41. Id. at 1130. 
42. Id. 
43. See notes 6 & 7 supra. 
44. Trading in such circumstances would result in liability under § 16(b) of the 
1934 Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1976). 
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transactions whether or not they were effected on a national ex­
change. 45 
Although it was intended to close a loophole, the broad lan­
guage of rule lOb-5 effectively allowed wide flexibility in its use 
and thrust it to the forefront of securities regulation. The rule46 
prohibits devious schemes, any fraudulent course of business, and 
also bans 'misleading partial disclosure of information by "any per­
son" in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.47 There 
is, however, no explicit mention ofa duty to disclose or of"insiders"48 
contained within rule lOb-5 or section lO(b). Therefore, difficult 
questions arose in cases in which a person buying or selling securi­
ties failed to disclose material nonpublic information within his pos­
session. The problem in these nondisclosure, or silence, cases was 
to delineate the situations which triggered a duty to disclose the 
information. 
In early opinions, the duty to disclose material nonpublic in­
formation was required of a limited category of insiders, tra­
ditionally meaning directors, officers, and controlling shareholders 
of the issuer corporation. 49 These insiders were obligated to dis­
close information received from sources within the corporation 
based on a fiduciary duty to the issuer's shareholders. 50 In a prolif­
45. SEC Exch. Act ReI. No. 34-3230 (May 21, 1942), reprinted in 4 A. BROM­
BERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD, App. B, at 295 
(1979). 
46. See note 23 supra. 
47. The language of rule 1Ob-5(b) is strikingly similar to that of § 12(2) of the 
1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976). Rule 1Ob-5 was, however, modelled after the pro­
visions of §§ 17(a)(2) & (3) of the 1933 Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) & (3) 
(1976). See, e.g., Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. ' 
denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). 
48. Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1976), however, 
explicitly limits liability to beneficial owners of more than 10% of any equity secu­
rity, directors, or officers. 
49. E.g., Reed v. Riddle Airlines, 266 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1959) (officers, direc­
tors); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951) (majority share­
holders); In re Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943) (officers). 
50. See Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages, 93 HARV. 
L. REV. 322, 344-47 (1979). In Brudney's view, this principle of fiduciary responsibil­
ity is based on notions of fidelity, efficiency, and equity. Fidelity means that corpo­
rate insiders should not be entitled to trade on inside information acquired in the 
course of pursuing the shareholders' business. Id. at 344. Efficiency concerns corpo­
rate insiders, who "through control of the corporate apparatus," create an impression 
or mistaken impression of corporate affairs to outsiders. Imposition of a disclosure re­
quirement on corporate insiders is the least costly method to correct information. Id. 
at 345. Corporate insiders have a lawful monopoly on access to information. Outsid­
ers, through their diligent efforts to uncover investment information may possess 
more information, but it is considered unfair and inequitable for corporate insiders to 
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eration of litigation under rule lOb-5, courts expanded the scope of 
the duty of disclosure. 51 The rationale behind broad judicial inter­
pretation of the language of the rule was primarily to equalize ac­
cess to inside information concerning material corporate activity 
between corporate insiders and the uninformed investing public. 52 
Restraint on insider trading was consistent with the New Deal re­
sponse to the victimization of investors during the 1920's. 53 Re­
strictions were thought necessary to eradicate the idea that trading 
on the basis of superior knowledge due to greater access to infor­
mation was a normal perquisite of corporate office. 54 
The scope of those subject to the duty of disclosure was first 
expanded in an SEC proceeding, In re Cady, Roberts & Co. 55 In 
Cady, Roberts, a broker-dealer in securities, whose partner was a 
director of a corporation, sold a large number of shares of the com­
pany's stock upon receiving information from the director-partner 
that the corporation would shortly reduce the rate of dividends 
paid upon the shares. 56 The SEC unanimously held that the 
broker-dealer was subject to the same disqualification from trading 
as his partner, the employee of the issuer corporation. As Commis­
sion Chairman Cary stated, the categories of officers, directors, and 
controlling shareholders do not exhaust the classes of persons upon 
whom there is a duty to disclose: 
Analytically, the obligation rests on two principal elements; 
first, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or in­
directly, to information intended to be available only for a cor­
porate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and 
second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes 
advantage of such information knowing that it is unavailable to 
those with whom he is dealing. 57 
trade on the basis of inside information because theirs is an advantage "which can­
not be competed away." Id. at 346. 
51. E.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), 
eert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Reed v. Riddle Airlines, 266 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 
1959); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D.N.Y. 1946). 
52. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), 
eert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). 
53. 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITlES 
FRAUD § 2.2, at 2:13 (1979). 
54. See § 2 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1976); § 16 of the 1934 Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 78p (1976); H.R. REp. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934); S. REp. No. 
792, 73d Cong., 24· Sess. 9 (1934). See also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 
833, 848 n.9 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), eert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); In re Cady, 
Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 n.15 (1961). 
55. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). 
56. Id. at 909. 
57. Id. at 912. 
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The Cady, Roberts test was adopted by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sul­
phur Co. (TGS), 58 which cited the access fonnula as "the essence" 
of rule lOb-5. 59 The TGS court articulated the duty of disclosure 
by stating that anyone in possession of material nonpublic infonna­
tion must either disclose it or, if disabled from disclosing it in or­
der to protect a corporate confidence, must abstain from trading in 
or recommending the securities concerned while such infonnation 
remains undisclosed. 60 
The key, therefore, to determine which traders had a duty to 
disclose was not based merely on the individual's level in the hier­
archy of a corporation. The duty was predicated on an individu­
al's61 having a position in the issuer corporation, or having a special 
relationship to that corporation or its employees, which gave him 
access to material non public information emanating from sources 
within the issuer. The ambit of this broad duty to disclose ex­
tended beyond traditional corporate insiders to include, for exam­
ple, outside brokers and dealers of securities trading on the basis of 
access to infonnation from within the corporation, either on behalf 
of clients or for their own account. 62 Underwriters of a corpora­
tion's securities, attorneys, and accountants for the issuer were also 
forbidden to personally profit from undisclosed infonnation re­
ceived due to their special relationship to the issuer which made 
them privy to internal corporate secrets. These "tippees,"63 in re­
58. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), eert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). 
59. Id. at 848. 
60. Id. Although the duty was phrased in terms of "disclose or abstain" from 
trading, abstention would be preferred rather than a premature disclosure of informa­
tion. See note 7 supra. Thus the object of the disclose-or-abstain rule may be seen as 
an attempt to deny the possessor of a chance to trade on the basis of superior access 
to information, rather than as an attempt to inform investors to aid in their invest­
ment decisionmaking. Brudney, supra note 50, at 338. 
61. Rule lOb-5 explicitly uses the words "any person." See note 23 supra. 
62. 4 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITlES 
FRAUD § 12.4, at 273 (1979). 
63. Perhaps the earliest use of the term "tippees" is found in III L. Loss, SE­
CURITlES REGULATION 1451 (2d ed. 1961). Loss noted, "Whatever duty of disclosure 
rule lOb-5 imposes upon officers, directors and controlling persons could be readily 
bypassed if the same duty were not held to devolve at least upon members of their 
immediate families." ld. at 1450. 
Judicial recognition of the Cady, Roberts principle to hold tippees liable under 
rule lOb-5 followed in Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). In Ross, a 
member of the family controlling the issuer and two friends were considered to be 
not only insiders, although none was an officer, director or employee, but also 
tippees. The court defined tippees as "persons given information by insiders in 
breach oftrust." ld. at 410. 
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ceipt of material nonpublic infonnation directly from sources within 
the issuer, were bound by the same obligation to disclose or ab­
stain based on the imputation of a fiduciary duty through their in­
side source to the issuer's selling shareholders.64 The receipt of in­
side infonnation placed the outside tippees in a special relationship 
of access to inside corporate information where no relationship pre­
viously existed. 
As the history of the rule illustrates, the scope of the duty to 
disclose under rule lOb-5 underwent a marked broadening after its 
inception. The duty to disclose or abstain from trading was con­
strued to apply to both insiders and outsider tippees who pur­
chased shares on the basis of access to material non public infonna­
tion from sources inside the issuer. Yet, until the decision by the 
Second Circuit in Chiarella, no one, whether insider or outsider, 
had been held liable under rule lOb-5 for trading on the basis of 
access to infonnation received from a source outside the issuer cor­
poration. Chiarella, however, did not fall under the scope of disclo­
sure delineated by the Second Circuit in TGS. He did not have 
access to material nonpublic infonnation through a special rela­
tionship to the issuer corporation. Chiarella was an outsider with 
access to inside infonnation of the tender offerors by virtue of his 
special relationship as printer to those corporations. Using the con­
fidential infonnation of the outside source, he purchased securities 
of the issuer, target corporations. 
To the court of appeals and to the United States Supreme 
Court, therefore, Chiarella freely admitted his stock trading activi­
ties. 65 He also recognized that those in a position of special rela­
tionship to the issuer corporations with access to their material 
nonpublic information must refrain from trading as he had or incur 
liability under section lO(b) and rule lOb-5. Chiarella, however, ar­
gued that he was not in any sense an insider of the target corpora­
tions. 66 He maintained, therefore, that he owed no fiduciary duty 
to the target's shareholders who sold their shares before the tender 
offers were announced although they had thereby lost the chance 
to profit on the rise in market price of the target's stock. 
64. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 853. 
65. Chiarella v. United States, 100 S. Ct. at 1123 (Burger, C. J., dissenting) 
(quoting the trial record at 474,496 & 711). 
66. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1364. 
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III. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S EXPANSION OF RULE 
lOb-5 LIABILITY 
The majority on the United' States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit disagreed with Chiarella's position, holding that it 
was irrelevant whether or not Chiarella was an insider of the 
companies whose securities he traded. 67 Citing Chiarella's strategic 
place in the market, the majority wrote that those who occupy 
such places should not personally profit from information received 
by virtue of their position. 68 The court did not distinguish Chia­
rella from corporate insiders of the issuer corporation who purchase 
its securities on the basis of access to nonpublic information from 
sources inside their corporations. In fact, the Second Circuit major­
ity termed Chiarella's access to information a better opportunity 
to garner sure profits than that of the "most unscrupulous officer 
or director."69 
The court established a new class of market insiders, stating 
flatly that "anyone--corporate insider or not-who regularly re­
ceives material nonpublic information may not use that information 
to trade in securities without incurring an affirmative duty to dis­
close. "70 The court later noted that its test of "regular access to 
market information" should provide a "workable rule,"71 embracing 
"those who occupy ... strategic places in the market mechanism. "72 
Judge Meskill, dissenting on the court of appeals, was alarmed 
at the drastic broadening of liability under section lO(b) and rule 
lOb-5, particularly within the context of a criminal proceeding. 73 
He refuted the majority's extension of section lO(b), citing the tradi­
tional test requiring a duty to disclose or abstain from trading, which 
was limited to persons with a special relationship to the company 
affected by the information. 74 Judge Meskill noted that no case had 
been cited by the majority in which criminal or civil liability had 
been imposed on anyone other than someone standing in a special 
relationship to other traders.75 The underlying reason behind the 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 1365. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. (emphasis in original). 
71. Id. at 1365-66 (emphasis added). 
72. Id. at 1365. 
73. Id. at 1373 (Meskill, J., dissenting). 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
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court's imposition of a duty to disclose or abstain on one like 
Chiarella, who occupied an essential position in the marketplace, 
drew a sympathetic response from Judge Meskill. He stressed, 
however, the need to resist the temptation to redraft legislation by 
reading into it what one would like to see written there. 76 
Apart from Judge Meskill's criticism that the broadening of 
rule lOb-5 liability found no firm roots in prior law, the Second 
Circuit's test also raised the spectre of unforeseen difficulties in its 
interpretation, application, and effect on other traders. The court's 
dual phrasings of the new test, "anyone's regular receipt of mate­
rial nonpublic information" and "regular access to market informa­
tion," each contained a subtle difference in emphasis. "Material 
nonpublic information" is information which affects not only the 
price of a company's stock but the value of a company's assets and 
earning power as well. 77 The secret knowledge of officers and di­
rectors that land their corporation owns contains commercially val­
uable mineral deposits describes the familiar inside information sit­
uation of TGS .78 Market information, on the other hand, refers to 
information about events or circumstances which affect the market 
for a company's securities, but not its assets or earning power. 79 
The undisclosed knowledge of a corporate president that a financial 
report is about to be published containing a favorable analysis of 
the corporation and a recommendation to buy the stock depicts a 
situation involving market information. 80 
Material nonpublic information has formed the basis for rule 
lOb-5 violations since it is information generated from sources in­
side a corporation relating directly to that corporation or its activi­
ties. Market information, on the other hand, usually emanates from 
outside the corporation. 81 Because it concerns any information 
which may affect the market for a company's stock, situations 
involving market information occur with great frequency. 82 
The Securities Industry Association (Association), in a memo­
randum amicus curiae filed with the United States Supreme Court, 
76. Id. at 1377. 
77. Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, All IllitialIllquiry into the Responsibility 
to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 798, 798 (1973). 
78. Id. See also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 833. 
79. Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 77, at 799. 
80. Id. 
81. Securities Indus. Assoc. memorandum amicus curiae at 4, Chiarella v. 
United States, 100 S. Ct. at n08. 
82. Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 77, at 799. 
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criticized both the Second Circuit's emphasis on liability predicated 
on abuses of "market information" and on "anyone's regular re­
ceipt" of that information. 83 The Association asserted that the test 
of the court of appeals constituted an overly broad extension of rule 
lOb-5 liability which would adversely affect the trading activities of 
securities dealers such as specialists, block positioners, and floor 
traders.84 The Association contended that both the SEC and Con­
gress had noted that these market professionals perform neces­
sary85 functions in the securities marketplace by "risking their capi­
tal to abswb imbalances in supply and demand and by helping to 
increase the depth, liquidity, and orderliness of trading markets," 
all of which enable investors to make trading decisions with ease 
and confidence. 86 Due to their central position in the securities 
marketplace, market professionals routinely engage in transactions 
while in regular receipt of valuable information which may, in 
many instances, be material, nonpublic market information. 87 
The implication of the Second Circuit's test was that the mere 
status of a person as a market insider may have been sufficient to 
trigger a duty to disclose or to abstain from trading. The decision 
therefore suggested that market professionals would have been au­
tomatically disabled from their normal trading activities by the 
threat of liability under rule lOb-5. 88 
Although there is considerable debate concerning the extent to 
which market professionals should be allowed to exploit informa­
tional advantages,89 the Association argued that the activities of 
market professionals were already extensively regulated by other 
provisions of the securities laws. 90 Furthermore, securities dealers 
83. Securities Indus. Assoc. memorandum amicus curiae at 4-5, Chiarella v. 
United States, 100 S. Ct. at 1108 (emphasis in original). 
84. Id. at 11-12 & n.lo 
85. Id. at 13 (quoting SEC Exch. Act ReI. No. 34-9950 (Jan. 16, 1973), 38 Fed. 
Reg. 3902 (1973)). ~ 
86. [d. 
87. [d. at 13. The information may relate, for example, to the 
(i) volume and type of order flow in a particular security; (ii) existing bids 
and offers on a specialist's "book"; (iii) inventory of a block positioner, par­
ticularly blocks of stock that are to be "liquidated" or "laid off"; (iv) posi­
tions of arbitrageurs and risk arbitrageurs; and (v) institutional interest in the 
purchase or sale of blocks of stock. 
[d. (footnote omitted). 
88. [d. at 14. 
89. Brudney, supra note 50, at 363-64. 
90. See, e.g., §§ ll(a) and ll(b) of the 1934 Act, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78k 
(1976). As originally enacted, § ll(a) empowered the SEC to regulate trading of stock 
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were already subject to rule lOb-5 liability under the narrower cir­
cumstances of the TGS standard, namely when trading on the basis 
of a special relationship giving access to material nonpublic infor­
mation from inside the issuer. 91 
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S STANDARD OF RULE 
lOb-5 LIABILITY 
The Supreme Court's opinion, which reversed Chiarella's con­
viction, reflected a recognition of the criticisms raised by both 
Judge Meskill and the memorandum amicus curiae. Justice Powell, 
writing for the majority, first reviewed the language and legislative 
history of section lO(b) and decided that neither stated whether the 
failure to inform sellers of target company securities constituted a 
manipulative or deceptive device. 92 The Court then cited the 
Cady, . Roberts formulation of the disclose-or-abstain obligation. 93 
Like Judge Meskill, however, Justice Powell emphasized that the 
duty to disclose arises from the existence of a relationship of trust 
and confidence. 94 Identifying the need to find such a relationship 
between the shareholders of a corporation and those insiders who 
have obtained confidential information "by reason of their position 
with that corporation"95 differs from finding a relationship to the is­
suer which allows access to information. Thus, while the Court, in 
passing, acknowledged the landmark TGS decision of the Second 
Circuit, recognition was premised on the violation of section lO(b) 
by corporate insiders using undisclosed information for their own 
exchange members for their own account. As amended in 1975, § 11(a) expanded the 
potential prohibition on exchange members trading for their own accounts. Congress, 
however, exempted certain transactions, including those by specialists, block 
positioners and others. Act of June 4, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 6(2), 89 Stat. 110 
(1975). The transactions were "deemed either to be beneficial to the markets or not 
to pose so great a danger to the fair and orderly functioning of the markets...." S. 
REP. No. 94-75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1975), as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-29 id. 
Section ll(b) prohibits specialists from revealing information with respect to or­
ders placed with them, although they are permitted to trade for their own accounts. 
15 U.S.C. § 78k(b) (1976). 
91. See 4 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODI_TIES 
FRAUD § 12.4, at 273 (1967): "Many people think of lOb-5 as an insider regulation, 
with good reason. No one, except perhaps the broker-dealer, has been hit by it so 
hard or so often as corporate insiders trading in their own shares" (emphasis added) 
(footnotes omitted). 
92. 100 S. Ct. at 1113. 
93. Id. at 1114. 
94. [d. 
95. Id. (emphasis added). 
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benefit; no mention was made of the rGS statement that access is 
the essence of the rule. 96 
To uphold Chiarella's conviction under the Second Circuit's 
test would, according to the majority, result in the recognition of a 
general duty between all participants in market transactions based 
on material nonpublic information, a radical departure from ex­
isting law. 97 The Court stressed, however, that "a duty to disclose 
under section 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of non­
public market information. "98 
The majority's opinion termed the reasoning of the Second 
Circuit's test "defective" because the element required to make si­
lence fraudulent under rule 1Ob-5, a duty to disclose, was absent 
in Chiarella's case. 99 No duty could arise from Chiarella's relation­
ship with the sellers of the target companies' securities since he 
had had no prior dealings with them: "He was not their agent, he 
was not a fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the sellers had 
placed their trust and confidence. He was, in fact, a complete 
stranger who dealt with the sellers only through impersonal market 
transactions. "100 
The Court· also noted that Chiarella was convicted of violating 
section 1O(b) although he had received no confidential information 
from the target companies, only market information concerning the 
plans of the acquiring companies. 10l Echoing the argument of the 
memorandum amicus curiae, the Court pointed out that abuses of 
market information "have been addressed by detailed and sophisti­
cated regulation that recognizes when use of market information 
may not harm operation of the securities markets. "102 
Emphasis placed by the majority on the need to find a special 
relationship between traders, rather than on a relationship giving 
access to information triggering the disclose-or-abstain rule, met 
with considerable resistance from Chief Justice Burger and Justice 
Blackmun, each of whom wrote adissenting opinion. loa Both Jus­
tices were quick to point to the broad language of section 1O(b) and 
96. Id. at 1115. See text accompanying note 59 supra. 
97. Id. at 1117. 
98. Id. at 1118. 
99. Id. at 1116. 
100. Id. at 1116-17. 
101. Id. at 1116. 
102. Id. at 1117. 
103. Justice Marshall joined Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion. 
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rule lOb-5, referring as they do to fraudulent activity by "any per­
son."104 As Chief Justice Burger remarked, the inclusion in the 
statute and the rule of the language referring to "any person" 
plainly negates the majority's suggestion that congressional concern 
was limited to trading by corporate insiders or to deceptive prac­
tices related to corporate information. lOS 
Additionally, the dissenting opinions of Chief Justice Burger 
and Justice Blackmun regarded the Cady, Roberts test as imposing 
a duty to disclose based on two factors: (1) Access to information 
intended to be available for a corporate purpose and not merely 
the presence of a common law fiduciary duty; and (2) the inherent 
unfairness of trading on such information when it is inaccessible to 
other traders. lOG Chief Justice Burger's opinion stressed that both 
factors are present whenever a trader like Chiarella gains an infor­
mational advantage by unlawful means. 107 The solution proposed 
by the Chief Justice would have been to hold Chiarella liable un­
der the principle that a person who has misappropriated nonpublic 
information has an absolute duty to disclose that information or to 
abstain from trading. 108 
Justice Blackmun was willing to go further and found no need 
to base Chiarella's conviction on a misappropriation theory. Ac­
cording to Justice Blackmun, Chiarella would have been liable 
"even if he had obtained the blessing of his employer's principals 
before embarking on his profiteering scheme."109 Justice Blackmun 
regarded Chiarella's conduct as lying "close to the heart of what 
the securities laws are intended to prohibit. "110 The trend in deci­
sions by the Court to narrow the scope of section lO(b) and rule 
lOb-5, according to Justice Blackmun, has transformed section 
lO(b) from an elastic catch-all provision to one which catches "rela­
tively little of the misbehavior that all too often makes investment 
in securities a needlessly risky business for the uninitiated in­
vestor. "111 While Justice Blackmun could not wholeheartedly sup­
104. Id. at 1121 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Id. at 1126 (Blackmun, J., dis­
senting). See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 
(1972). 
105. 100 S. Ct. at 1121 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
!06. Id. at. 1121 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Id. at 1125 (Blackmun, J., dis­
senting). 
107. Id. at 1121 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
108. Id. See also text accompanying notes 140-49 infra. 
109. 100 S. Ct. at 1123 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The "employer's principals" 
to whom Justice Blackmun refers are the tender offeror corporations. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 1123-24 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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port the market insider test of the court of appeals, he proposed 
his own test. In order to reject tolerance of manipulative and de­
ceitful behavior, Justice Blackmun would have prohibited all per­
sons having access to confidential material information which was 
not legally available to others from engaging in schemes to exploit 
their structural informational advantage through trading in affected 
securities. 112 
The majority openly rejected Justice Blackmun's standard for 
liability as not substantially different from that of the court of ap­
peals. 113 Such a view, according to the majority opinion, disregards 
the necessity to find a special relationship between traders which 
triggers the obligation to disclose or abstain from trading. 114 
The majority's need to hinge a duty to disclose or abstain from 
trading on those in a special relationship to other traders clarifies 
the substance of nondisclosure violations under rule lOb-5. Clearly, 
insiders trading on the basis of corporate information from sources 
inside the issuer are subject to the disclose-or-abstain rule and the 
watchful eye of the SEC. 
On the other hand, the liability of tippees115 in light of the 
Chiarella opinion is not as clear. The Court stated that tippees of 
corporate insiders had been held liable under section lO(b) because 
of their duty not to profit from the use of confidential information. 
The tippee's obligation, the Court noted, has been viewed as 
arising from his role as a participant after the fact in the insider's 
breach of a fiduciary duty.116 As Justice Blackmun pointed out, the 
Court failed to state explicitly whether "the obligations of a special 
relationship must fall directly upon the person engaging in an al­
legedly fraudulent transaction or whether the derivative obligations 
of 'tippees' that lower courts have long recognized, are encom­
passed by its rule."117 Because of the apparent ambiguity in the 
majority's opinion, the conduct of tippees trading through corpo­
rate insiders on the basis of their inside information may prove a 
new, fertile ground of litigation. 
The possibility of liability for nondisclosure under rule lOb-5 
for outsiders, such as Chiarella trading on the basis of information 
from sources outside the issuer, has been sharply curtailed by the 
112. Id. at 1126 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
113. Id. at 1118 n.20. 
114. Id. 
115. See text accompanying notes 63 & 64 supra. 
116. 100 S. Ct. at 1115-16 n.12. 
117. Id. at 1124 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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majority's decision absent the showing of prior dealings between 
the trader and sellers of the issuer's securities. The Court, how­
ever, did express a willingness to extend rule lOb-5 liability under 
an alternative theory advanced by the government. 118 Indeed, a 
majority of the Court might have affirmed Chiarella's conviction on 
these grounds, had the theory clearly been presented to the jury at 
Chiarella's trial. 119 
v. THE GOVERNMENT'S TEST 
The government, taking a surprising position, did not request 
that Chiarella's conviction be affirmed on the grounds delineated 
by the Second Circuit. In agreement with the contention of the As­
sociation, the government asserted in its brief to the Supreme 
Court "that certain language in the opinion of the court of appeals 
. . . incorrectly suggests that mere possession or regular receipt of 
confidential market information precludes market professionals . . . 
from carrying on their normal business activities. "120 The govern­
ment, however, stressed that this interpretation by the Association 
was founded on language read out of context. 121 Concerned, never
theless, by the Association's criticism of the Second Circuit's test, 
the Justice Department requested affirmation of Chiarella's convic­
tion by the Supreme Court upon different grounds. 
The government's alternative theory was aimed at avoiding the 
adoption of a single test to govern nondisclosure violations under 
rule lOb-5. The Justice Department contended that Chiarella's use 
of the information from the tender offeror amounted to secret con­
version of confidential information for purely personal profit. 122 
Borrowing language used by the district court, the government ar~ 
gued that the conversion of material information was akin to em­
bezzlement123 by which Chiarella defrauded the corporations that 
had entrusted him with the encoded data. This breach of his duty 
to the acquiring corporations, the government maintained, prac­
U8. See text accompanying notes U9-24 infra. 

Ug. See text accompanying notes 125-35 infra. 

120. Brief for United States at 70 n.48, Chiarella v. United States, 100 S. Ct. at 
U08. 
121. Id. 
122. Brieffor United States at 28, Chiarella v. United States, 100 S. Ct. at ll08. 
123. Id. at 16 (citing United States v. Chiarella, 450 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 
1978)). 
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ticed through the purchase and sale of securities, constituted a 
scheme to defraud in violation of rule lOb-5 and section 1O(b).124 
With regard to the government's contention that Chiarella had 
defrauded the tender offerors, the majority decided that the jury, 
in this criminal case, had not been instructed on the nature or ele­
ments of a duty owed by Chiarella to anyone other than the sellers 
of the target's stock. 125 Therefore, the majority declined to decide 
whether the government's theory had merit. 126 
Chief Justice Burger, in dissent, thought the Court's reading 
of the trial court's instructions was unduly restrictive. In his opin­
ion, reading the charge to the jury as a whole and in the context of 
the trial required the jury to find that Chiarella obtained his trad­
ing advantage by misappropriating the property of his employer's 
customers. Citing the instructions to the jury in the trial record, 
Chief Justice Burger noted: "[I]n simple terms, the charge is that 
Chiarella wrongfully took advantage of information he acquired in 
the course of his confidential position at Pandick Press. "127 
Justice Brennan agreed with the Chief Justice's analysis of the 
substantive law, that a "person violates section lO(b) whenever he 
improperly obtains or convt:)rts to his own benefit nonpublic infor­
124. Brief for United States at 28, Chiarella v. United States, 100 S. Ct. at 
1108. In cases such as Chiarella, there exists the possibility of liability under prin­
ciples of common law established in decisions such as Brophy v. Cities Service Co., 
31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949), even in the absence of liability under rule 10b-5. 
In Brophy, the "confidential secretary" to a director of Cities Service Co. bought and 
sold securities at a profit because he had learned in advance when the corporation 
would buy large blocks of its own stock. The court held the corporate secretary lia­
ble to Cities Service Co. as a constructive trustee for all profits the employee real­
ized by virtue of having acquired nonpublic information relating to his employer's 
business. 
A significant factor in the Brophy court's opinion was that Cities Service Co. had 
entered the market as an actual purchaser of securities. This factor is also present in 
Chiarella, as the tender offerors were purchaser of the target companies' stock. 
At oral argument before the Supreme Court, Chiarella's attorney, Stanley Arkin, 
argued that sanctions other than those imposed by rule lOb-5 would have been more 
appropriate ways to have dealt with Chiarella's conduct. [1979] SEC. .REG. & L. REP. 
(BNA) No. 527, at A-2. He noted that his client had been dismissed by his employer 
for breaking the printing company rules against the use of confidential information. 
He also suggested that state court suits for breach of contract or unlawful conversion 
of corporate opportunity might have been used against Chiarella instead of the fed­
eral securities laws. Attorney Arkin did acknowledge that there was no criminal pen­
alty against Chiarella's conduct under New York law, where the action arose, al­
though other states do prohibit forms of industrial espionage. ld. 
125. 100 S. Ct. at 1118. 
126. Id. at 1119. 
127. Id. at 1122 (Burger, C.]., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
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mation which he then uses in connection with the purchase or sale 
of securities. "128 Justice Brennan, however, was unable to find an 
instruction to the jury suggesting that one element of Chiarella's 
offense was the improper conversion of nonpublic information. Ac­
cordingly, rather than joining the Chief Justice's dissent, Justice 
Brennan concurred in the opinion of the majority. 
Justice Stevens also concurred in the majority's opinion strictly 
on the grounds outlined by Justice Powell. 129 Justice Stevens 
agreed that civil or criminal violations of rule lOb-5 necessitate the 
identification of the duty the defendant has breached. Justice Ste­
vens agreed, too, that the Court correctly decided not to address 
the question of whether Chiarella's breach of his duty of silence to 
his employer and the tender offerors could give rise to criminal lia­
bility under rule lOb_5. 130 He indicated, however, the problems 
which the government will face when it next attempts to prove lia­
bility under its theory. It could be argued that Chiarella's breach of 
a duty to the acquiring companies that had entrusted confidential 
information constituted "a fraud or a deceit upon those companies 
'in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.' "131 On 
the other hand, Justice Stevens pointed out that "inasmuch as 
those companies would not be able to recover damages from peti­
tioner for violating rule lOb-5 because they were neither purchas­
ers nor sellers of target company securities, "132 it could be argued 
that no actionable violation of rule lOb-5 had occurred. 133 
With Justice Stevens willing to entertain arguments on the 
government's theory and four other Justices willing to go at least as 
128. Id. at ll20 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
129. Id. at lll9 (Stevens, J., concurring). See text accompanying notes 113 & 
114 supra. 
130. Id. at ll19 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
131. ld. (citing Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th 
Cir.), cen. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1973)). Justice Stevens noted that the specific hold­
ing of Eason had been rejected in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U:S. 
723 (1975). He then commented, "However, the limitation on the right to recover pe­
cuniary damages in a private action identified in Blue Chip is not necessarily coex­
tensive with the limits of the rule itself." 100 S. Ct. at 1119n.*. 
132. ld. at ll19-20 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
133. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), only pri­
vate actions for damages were limited under rule 10b-5, however. The Court held 
that standing to bring a private civil suit is restricted to actual purchasers or sellers 
of securities. Therefore, the fact that the tender offerors were neither purchasers nor 
sellers of the target companies' securities would prevent a private action under the 
rule and the subsequent recovery of damages. Contrary to Justice Stevens' assess­
ment, however, the actual purchaser or seller requirement would not preclude an ac­
tionable violation of rule 1Ob-5 in a suit initiated by the SEC. 
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far as upholding a misappropriation theory,l34 the possibility exists 
that Chiarella's conviction would have been upheld had the theory 
of liability clearly been presented to the jury.135 Yet the majority 
decided it had not. Acceptance of the government's theory, there-' 
fore, has yet to be confirmed. Until such a determination is made, 
the limitation of liability' under section lO(b) and rule lOb-5 to the 
standard accepted by the majority's decision could lead to anoma­
lous results. For example, if a printer such as Chiarella were to 
convert nonpublic information acquired from a tender offeror, he 
could remain silent and purchase securities of the target corpora­
tion. He would be obtaining information from an outside source. 
Consequently, he would have no relationship to the sellers of the 
target company's stock for he would be "a complete stranger who 
dealt with the sellers only through impersonal market transac­
tions. "136 On the other hand, if the printer were to obtain material 
nonpublic information from merger documents submitted by a tar­
get corporation, he would be prohibited from trading without dis­
closure under the Chiarella decision as long as he were considered 
the agent of the target company's selling shareholders or one with 
whom they had had prior dealings. 137 If not, he too would be free 
to trade without disclosure. By upholding the government's theory, 
the Supreme Court could eliminate the possibility that the printer 
would be free to trade in either situation. Liability would be prem­
ised on the misappropriation of information from the target and 
tender offeror corporations employing the printing firm. 
Still, nondisclosure violations under rule lOb-5 would then be 
subject to two standards. Liability for corporate insiders and, sub­
ject to clarification, their tippees, would be based on a fiduciary or 
pre-existing relationship to the selling shareholders of the corpora­
tion's stock. Liability for an outsider- obtaining information from an 
outside source would be predicated upon finding the breach of an 
employee's duty through the misappropriation of information. A 
more uniform test under rule lOb-5 is preferable. 
In addition, the majority's view of rule lOb-5, although it is a 
good base from which to start, restricts the standard of liability to 
134. The Justices suggesting a willingness to uphold the government's theory 
are: Burger, Brennan, Blackmun and Marshall. 
135. The United States Attorney's office in New York is considering whether to 
prosecute Chiarella under the government's theory. Wall St. J., March 19, 1980, at 
12, col. 3. 
136. 100 S. Ct. at 1117. 
137. See text accompanying note 100 supra. 
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its earliest beginnings. By doing so, the opinion unduly hampers 
the SEC in the agency's ability to deter and punish those who em­
ploy new manipulative and cunning devices in securities transac­
tions. 13S 
The majority opinion did hint that rule making by the SEC 
evidenced by congressional intent could be the method by 
which fraudulent conduct resting on a "'somewhat different 
theory' than that previously used to regulate insider trading un­
der section lO(b)" may be reached. 139 No such judicial reliance on 
138. The meager legislative history of § lO(b) indicates that its purpose was in­
tended to be expansive. In the first version of the Bill, § 9(c) was summarized by one 
who helped draft the provision, Thomas G. Corcoran: 
Subsection (c) says, 'Thou shalt not devise any other cunning devices.' 
... Of course subsection (c) is a catch-all clause to prevent manipulative de­
vices. I do not think there is any objection to that kind of a clause. The 
Commission should have the authority to deal with new manipulative de­
vices. 
Stock Exchange Regulation, Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House 
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934), re­
printed in 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LoWENFELS, SECUmTIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES 
FRAUD § 2.2, at 2:23 n.(332) (1979). 
139. 100 S. Ct. at 1117-18. In fact, the SEC recently adopted rule 14e-3, which 
provides: 
§ 240.14e-3--Transactions in securities on the basis of material, non­
public information in the context of tender offers. 
(a) 	 If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence, or has 
commenced, a tender offer (the "offering person"), it shall constitute a 
fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act or practice within the mean­
ing of section 14( e) of the Act for any other person who is in possession 
of material information relating to such tender offer which information 
he knows or has reason to know is nonpublic and which he knows or 
has reason to know has been acquired directly or indirectly from (1) the 
offering person, (2) the issuer of the securities sought or to be sought by 
such tender offer, or (3) any. officer, director, partner or employee or 
any other person acting on behalf of the offering person or such issuer, 
to purchase or sell or cause to be purchased or sold any of such securi­
ties or any securities convertible into or exchangeable for any such se­
curities or any option or right to obtain or to dispose of any of the fore­
going securities, unless within a reasonable time prior to any purchase 
or sale such information and its source are publicly disclosed by press 
release or otherwise. 
(b) 	 A person other than a natural person shall not violate paragraph (a) of 
this section if such person shows that: 
(1) 	 The individual(s) making the investment decision on behalf of 
such person to purchase or sell any security described in paragraph 
(a) or to cause any such security to be purchased or sold by or on 
behalf of others did not know the material, nonpublic information; 
and 
(2) 	 Such person had implemented one or a combination of policies 
and procedures, reasonable under the circumstances, taking into 
consideration the nature of the person's business, to ensure that in­
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rulemaking to cover nondisclosure cases is necessary, however, in 
light of the prior expansion of the rule. Nothing in the language, 
evolution, or history of the rule required the Court's narrow read­
ing of section lO(b) and rule lOb-S. 140 
dividual(s) making investment decision(s) would not violate para­
graph (a), which policies and procedures may include, but are not 
limited to, (i) those which restrict any purchase, sale and causing 
any purchase and sale of any such security or (ii) those which pre­
vent such individual(s) from knowing such information. 
(c) 	 Notwithstanding anything in paragraph (a) to the contrary, the following 
transactions shall not be violations of paragraph (a) of this section: 
(1) Purchase(s) of any security described in paragraph (a) by a broker 
or by another agent on behalf of an offering person; or 
(2) Sale(s) by any person of any security described in paragraph (a) to 
the offering person. 
(d) (1) As a means reasonably designed to prevent fraudulent, deceptive 
or manipulative acts or practices within the meaning of section 
14(e) of the Act, it shall be unlawful for any person described in 
paragraph (d)(2) of this section to communicate material, nonpublic 
information relating to a tender offer to any other person under cir­
cumstances in which it is reasonably foreseeable that such commu­
nication is likely to result in a violation of this section except that 
this paragraph shall not apply to a communication made in good 
faith, 
(i) To the officers, directors, partners or employees of the offer­
ing person, to its advisors or to other persons, involved in the 
planning, financing, preparation or execution of such tender 
offer; 
(ii) To the issuer whose securities are sought or to be be sought 
by such tender offer, to its officers, directors, partners, em­
ployees or advisors or to other persons, involved in the 
planning, financing, preparation or execution of the activities 
of the issuer with respect to such tender offer; or 
(iii) To any person pursuant to a requirement of any statute or rule 
or regulation promulgated thereunder. 
(d) (2) The persons referred to in paragraph (d)(I) of this section are: 
(i) The offering person or its officers, directors, partners, employ­
ees or advisors; 
(ii) The issuer of the securities sought or to be sought by such 
tender offer or its officers, directors, partners, employees or 
advisors; 
(iii) Anyone acting on behalf of the persons in paragraph (d)(2)(i) 
or the issuer or persons in paragraph (d)(2)(ii); and 
(iv) Any person in possession of material information relating to a 
tender offer which information he knows or has reason to 
know is nonpublic and which he knows or has reason to know 
has been acquired directly or indirectly from any of the above. 
SEC Exch. Act ReI. No. 34-17, 120 (Sept. 4, 1980), reprinted in 45 Fed. Reg. 60,410 
(1980) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3). 
The rule will cover activities by printers such as Chiarella, who are in posses­
sion of material nonpublic information relating to a tender offer. See 45 Fed. Reg. 
60,410,60,411-13 (1980). 
140. See text accompanying notes 34-65 supra. 
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VI. A NEW TEST 
The test now proposed would be based firmly on that deline­
ated by the Supreme Court majority in Chiarella with respect to 
corporate insiders but would incorporate a more liberal interpreta­
tion of rule lOb-5 to broaden liability to include instances when in­
formation is obtained from a source outside the issuer corporation. 
An interpretation of rule lOb-5 and the test of access under Cady, 
Roberts and TGS which is more flexible than the one the Supreme 
Court majority was willing to accept in Chiarella is warranted in 
order to promote both the equalization of access to information as a 
matter of public policy and fair dealing. 141 Even a modified expan­
sion of the duty to disclose, however, should not be as broad as the 
tests of the Second Circuit and Justice Blackmun. Rather, it should 
be flexible enough to encourage the private pursuit of market infor­
mation and narrow enough to insure that neither all outside invest­
ors nor market professionals trading in the ordinary course of busi­
ness are trapped in the net of rule lOb-5. This test would 
encompass the activities of one like Chiarella but give clear guid­
ance to future rule lOb-5 litigants as well. 
A. Materiality 
The first step in determining liability for nondisclosure viola­
tions would be to overcome the threshold question of material­
ity.l42 It should not make a difference whether the information will 
have a long-term impact on a company's earning power or assets or 
a short-term impact on the stock's market price. 143 Nor should it 
make a difference if the information is generated from within or 
without the issuer corporation. As long as the nonpublic informa­
141. It is possible that the Court may have been willing to consider an expan­
sion liability under rule lOb-5 had this been a civil and not a criminal case. See note 
31 supra, discussing the trend in Supreme Court decisions to narrow interpretation 
of the rule and section 10(b). 
142. The test for materiality is based on an objective standard. In SEC v. Texas 
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 849, the court determined that whether a fact were to 
be deemed material would depend on whether a reasonable man would attach im­
portance to the information in determining his action. In a more recent case, how­
ever, the United States Supreme Court in TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 
438, 449 (1975), held that the materiality of a particular fact depended on the "sub­
stantial likelihood" that it would assume actual significance in the investor's mind or 
would significantly alter the total mix of infonnation as he viewed it. The Court was 
concerned that too Iowa threshold of materiality would lead corporate management, 
concerned about liability, to inundate the investor with trivial information, a result 
hardly conducive to informed decisionmaking. Id. 
143. See 100 S. Ct. at 1121 n.1 (Burger, C.]., dissenting). 
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tion is considered material and is deemed to have a substantial im­
pact on the reasonable investor, there is an inherent problem of 
trading on the basis of unequal and therefore unfair access to infor­
mation. 144 In Chiarella's case, the information concerning impend­
ing tender offers on which he traded was stipulated to be mate­
rial. 145 While this threshold standard would apply to market 
professionals with access to material nonpublic market information, 
liability would still not be incurred unless it was determined that 
they were subject to a disqualification from trading. 
B. The Obligation to Disclose or Abstain from Trading 
1. Receipt of Information from a Source Inside the Issuer 
If the information is considered material, the next step would 
be to determine if the person involved has a duty to disclose or ab­
stain from trading. Consistent with the majority's opinion, if a 
trader is in a position of special relationship to the issuer's share­
holders with access to the issuer's inside confidential information at 
one time or as often as he chooses, there would be a duty to dis­
close or abstain from trading. This duty would be based on a fidu­
ciary obligation to the shareholders of the corporation's stock who 
sold during the period the information remained undisclosed; 
2. Receipt of Information from a Source Outside the Issuer 
The new proposals in this test, however, would impose a duty to 
disclose or abstain on certain insiders and outsiders with access to 
material nonpublic information from sources outside the issuer. Li­
ability for a corporate insider of the issuer receiving information 
from outside would also be based on a fiduciary duty to the corpo­
ration's shareholders. For example, the president of a corporation 
who heard from an outside financial analyst that the latter was 
about to publish a report favorable to the corporation146 would be 
in possession of information likely to have an impact on the price of 
the company's stock. 147 A duty to disclose or abstain from trading 
in such circumstances would be consistent with the long-standing 
144. See Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate Information Practices: 
The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REV. 1271, 1289 
(1965). 
145. See note 21 supra. 
146. See text accompanying note 80 supra. 
147. Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 77, at 798-99. 
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rationale behind rule lOb-5 which has been to deny trading advan­
tages by those in a position of superior access to information. 148 
One large category of potentially liable investors remains to be 
discussed. This category comprises traders with no relationship or 
fiduciary duty to the issuer corporation or its shareholders who re­
ceive material nonpublic information concerning the issuer from an 
outside source. Chiarella, market professionals, and a plethora of 
other traders would fall into this category. In order to prevent the 
test for liability from being considered overly broad, a duty to dis­
close should be imposed only after an examination of two factors. 
The means by which the trader acquired the material 
nonpublic information should be the first factor to be considered. 
In Chiarella's case, he did not simply overhear the information in 
an elevator or a restaurant. Policing situations in which outsiders 
trade on the basis of information acquired through eavesdropping 
would be administratively difficult. Nor did Chiarella simply ac­
quire the information through legitimate business operations. It 
was necessary for him to decode the information entrusted to his 
care before he could trade. A market professional, on the other 
hand, who acquired material information from a source outside the 
issuer while pursuing legitimate business operations, would not 
have violated the rule. If, however, he received a tip from a 
printer and realized he was obtaining converted information, sub­
sequent trading on the basis of that information would violate sec­
tion 1O(b) and rule lOb_5. 149 
The second factor to consider would be the trader's utilization 
of the information once it had been acquired. If the information is 
used to further day-to-day trading activities, no violation of rule 
lOb-5 would result. 150 On the other hand, the deliberate use of 
such information for purely personal gain would result in liability. 
Chiarella, for example, deliberately misappropriated the confiden­
tial information he received solely to reap personal profit. A market 
professional would also incur liability were he to do the same. Such 
a use would not be in furtherance of his function in the securities 
marketplace. Another example of a trader who could incur liability 
would be the president of a corporation who knew of the decision 
by his company to acquire a target company's stock. Under the Su­
148. Brudney, supra note 50, at 326. 
149. Brief for United States at 70-71 n,48, Chiarella v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 
at 1108. 
150. See Comment, The Application of Rule lOb-5 to "Market Insiders": 
United States v. Chiarella, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1538, 1547 (1979). 
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preme Court majority's standard for liability in silence cases, he 
would not incur liability as no relationship between himself and the 
target's shareholders would exist. Under the test now proposed, 
however, the deliberate use of this information acquired through 
confidential dealings and for purely personal profit would place him 
under a duty to disclose or abstain from trading. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The language and legislative history of rule lOb-5 and section 
lO(b) do not mention liability for failure to disclose material 
nonpublic information. Liberal judicial interpretation, however, 
imposed a duty to disclose or abstain from trading on corporate 
insiders and outsider tippees with access to inside information. 
Consistent with the historical expansion of liability under rule 
lOb-5, the court of appeals attempted to delineate a new test which 
would encompass the activities of a printer outside the issuer cor­
poration with access to information from an outside source. The 
test, though, was subject to criticism and unforeseen problems in 
application to an overly broad segment of market traders. In a de­
cision narrowing the scope of the duty to disclose to a standard 
based on the identification of a special relationship to the issuer's 
shareholders, the majority of the Supreme Court in Chiarella re­
futed the test of the court of appeals. In its place, the government 
posited an alternative theory of rule lOb-5 liability. The govern­
ment maintained that Chiarella's misuse of nonpublic information 
violated a duty of silence owed to his employer and to the tender 
offerors. The Supreme Court's willingness to consider the govern­
ment's misappropriation theory, when properly presented to the 
jury, leaves the door open to limited expansion in the future. Ac­
ceptance by the Court of the government's theory could result in 
the application of a dual standard of liability, however, depending 
upon whether a duty to the issuer's shareholders or to an employer 
has been violated. A more uniform test is now proposed. Narrower 
and more definitive than the tests offered by the Second Circuit 
and the dissent of Justice Blackmun, this test delineates a method 
of factual assessment based upon whether material nonpublic infor­
mation is received from a source inside or outside the issuer. If in­
formation is received from an inside source, the disclosure of such 
information or an abstention from trading would be warranted 
based upon a fiduciary duty or special relationship to the issuer's 
shareholders. Trading on the basis of receipt of information from an 
outside source would be carefully scrutinized. Corporate insiders 
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would be subject to a disqualification from trading also based upon 
the existence of a fiduciary duty. Liability for outsiders trading on 
information received from an outside source would be incurred 
only after an examination of two factors, the means by which the 
information was acquired and the subsequent utilization of that in­
formation. Consequently, the test now proposed would allow a nar­
row but flexible determination of the future outsiders who would 
incur a duty to disclose or abstain from trading in a corporation's 
securities. 
Lynda Godkin 
